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tax notes state
The Case for State Borrowing as a
Response to the Current Crises
by Darien Shanske and David Gamage
already argued, more than once2, that the federal
government should borrow to prevent steep state
and local budget cuts. But because the federal
government will apparently not take sufficient
3
action, we offer these ideas to states for how to
proceed with borrowing absent sufficient federal
aid.
Additional Clarification

Darien Shanske is a professor at the
University of California, Davis, School of Law
(King Hall), and David Gamage is a professor of
law at Indiana University Maurer School of
Law.
In this installment of Academic Perspectives
on SALT, the authors discuss how states could
borrow funds in the absence of federal aid
during the COVID-19 pandemic. The authors
would like to thank Adam Thimmesch and all
of the participants in the AMT Summer
Zoomposium for very helpful comments.
Introduction
The coronavirus pandemic is a national
emergency that requires a national response.
Asking states to absorb the budgetary losses
caused by the pandemic while they are tasked
with providing essential frontline services is
comparable to asking states during World War II
to pay for the landing in Normandy.
This article is a contribution to Project SAFE:
1
State Action in Fiscal Emergencies. We have

We are only encouraging states to borrow
against the backdrop of federal failure. Some have
argued that having states borrow to cover revenue
shortfalls caused by the pandemic would be a
4
better option than direct federal grants, but we are
emphatically not making that argument here. At
least sometimes, the contention that state
borrowing would be better is based on a notion of
limited federal borrowing capacity. Yet we think
this notion is both false and often hypocritical. It is
false because the federal government does have
5
substantial borrowing capacity, certainly more
than states do, and it is also hypocritical for
anyone who supported the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
to make this claim. This is because the TCJA
incurred over $1.5 trillion in federal debt during
an economic expansion in order to mostly benefit
the already well-off. One obvious problem with
pursuing this kind of reckless policy is precisely

2

Darien Shanske, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, and David Gamage,
“Reforming State Corporate Income Taxes Can Yield Billions,” Tax Notes
State, June 8, 2020, p. 1211; Shanske and Gamage, “How the Federal
Reserve Should Help States and Localities Right Now,” Tax Notes State,
May 11, 2020, p. 765.
3

Marianne Levine and John Bresnahan, “Standoff Over Covid Relief
Could Drag Into September,” Politico, Aug. 12, 2020.
4

Yuval Levin, “How Congress Can Help the States,” American
Enterprise Institute (May 6, 2020).
5

1

University of Virginia School of Law, “Project SAFE.”
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Jim Tankersley, “How Washington Learned to Embrace the Budget
Deficit,” The New York Times, May 16, 2020.
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that there might not be enough borrowing
capacity in an emergency.6
Sometimes this borrowing-is-better argument
is instead couched in terms of fairness between
7
states. This claim is also off base. For one, it seems
to assume that only profligate high-tax states are
suffering.8 This is not true; almost all states will
suffer collapsing revenue, and many of the socalled high-tax states did not enter the
coronavirus crisis in poor fiscal shape.9 Further,
there is no reason that federal aid cannot be
limited to help with the current crisis (that is, no
help with accrued pension debt), perhaps even
with some kind of per capita limit so as not to
reward supposedly overly generous states. A per
capita grant that makes Texas or Florida whole
would be a huge relief for California, too.
Raising Revenue Is Possible and Preferable
Federal failure has prompted us to encourage
states to raise revenue so as not to just make deep
cuts to services.10 However, we are not against
states also pursuing smaller cost-cutting
measures like hiring freezes.
Many revenue-raising tools are available, and
we previously urged state legislatures to consider
a number of promising reforms to cope with the
current crisis. Indeed, because state and local
revenue systems were in such need of reform even
before the beginning of this crisis, there are lots of
sensible reforms to raise significant revenue fairly
11
and efficiently.

6

William Gale and Yair Listokin, “The Tax Cuts Will Make Fighting
Future Recessions Complicated,” The Hill, Feb. 23, 2019.
7

See Levin, supra note 4.

Because states face balanced budget
constraints, the fact that we are in a recession is
12
not an argument against raising taxes. States and
localities should prioritize raising tax revenues
from those who can best pay over slashing
services needed by those who cannot afford to
lose them (or their jobs), especially because many
of those services play important roles in
13
preventing further harm to state economies.
The Case for State Borrowing
Another objection to the strategy of raising
revenue is that it might not be enough. The cost of
the pandemic is so large that even a state that
takes us up on our complete menu of revenueraising tools might still come up short. Current
estimates of the need range from $500 billion to $1
14
15
trillion. Revenue tools might not be enough, but
that does not mean states should not try to
prevent unnecessary cuts to the extent that they
can.
The deeper counter to this objection to
revenue raising is that states can and should
borrow, with the borrowing secured by the new
revenue streams. It seems quite reasonable to
surmise that in three years state finances will be
looking a lot better, even without new taxes.
Indeed, state revenues will likely look better still
in three years if they do not eat their seed corn
now by, for example, reducing funding for vital
services. Consider that if states worked on fiveyear budget cycles, a budget planner would be
well advised to borrow from later in that cycle to
pay for necessary expenses now, at the nadir.
Thus, the basic idea is that states should
smooth their taxing and spending by borrowing
from a better future to sustain the challenging
present. To ensure that there will be more revenue

8

Richard C. Auxier, “McConnell’s Attempt to Blame States for
COVID-19 Budget Shortfalls Is Wrong and Dangerous,” UrbanBrookings Tax Policy Center (Apr. 24, 2020).
9

See id.; Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “States Grappling
With Hit to Tax Collections” (updated Aug. 24, 2020); National
Conference of State Legislatures, “Coronavirus (COVID-19): Revised
State Revenue Projections” (updated Aug. 14, 2020).
10

See “Reforming State Corporate Income Taxes Can Yield Billions,”
supra note 2; see also Gamage and Shanske, “States Should Consider
Partial Wealth Tax Reforms,” Tax Notes State, May 18, 2020, p. 859; Adam
Thimmesch, Shanske, and Gamage, “Strategic Nonconformity to the
TCJA, Part I: Personal Income Taxes,” Tax Notes State, July 6, 2020, p. 17;
Shanske, Thimmesch, and Gamage, “Strategic Nonconformity, State
Corporate Income Taxes, and the TCJA: Part II,” Tax Notes State, July 13,
2020, p. 123.
11

See “Reforming State Corporate Income Taxes Can Yield Billions,”
supra note 2.
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12

See Gamage, “Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal
Volatility Problem,” 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749 (2010); Carolina Vargas,
“Massachusetts Economists Push for Higher Taxes Amid Pandemic,” Tax
Notes Today State, May 29, 2020.
13

Id.

14

National Governors Association, “National Governors Association
Outlines Need for ‘Additional and Immediate’ Fiscal Assistance to
States” (Apr. 11, 2020).
15

But not necessarily. For example, a state that paired a 20 percent
surcharge on the repatriation with a tax on unrealized capital gains (such
as a deemed realization proposal like we have proposed, “States Should
Consider Partial Wealth Tax Reforms,” supra note 10) could raise
considerable revenues in the short term, potentially well in excess of
what might be needed.
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in the future, states should improve their revenue
systems now — and there is a lot to improve.
Because there is so much to upgrade, putting into
place a suite of revenue enhancements now might
substantially help states and localities through the
ongoing emergency.
This is a different proposal than simply
borrowing without reform, because borrowing
without putting into place new revenue can be
hamstrung by one of two problems. First, the
borrowing could be too small. In that case, there is
little harm done to the state’s future revenue, but
it has done little to address the enormous current
crisis. On the other hand, a state could look to
borrow on a scale sufficient to the crisis, but
borrowing like that could place a large burden on
16
the state down the road without new revenues.
To be specific about securitizing revenue,
suppose California put into place our proposal to
broaden its corporate income tax base by shifting
17
to mandatory worldwide combination. In better
times, this was estimated to raise $2 billion per
year, a roughly 20 percent increase in state
corporate income tax revenues. Suppose
California securitized 10 percent of its corporate
income tax base — an estimated $1 billion per year
— for 20 years at a 5 percent rate. That would be
worth about $12 billion to California right now,
which is about 85 percent of the $14 billion that
the state is hoping the federal government will
provide to head off deep cuts.18 The cost of federal
funds is closer to 1 percent for a borrowing for 20
years — so if the Fed were to purchase these
bonds, as we have argued it should,19 then
California could raise $17 billion through this
expedient.
Note that before the onset of the coronavirus,
California was running a surplus without this
reform. So even if it were to raise 50 percent less
than expected, the state’s net fiscal position when

16

A recent CBPP report makes this point very persuasively. See
Michael Mazerov and Elizabeth McNichol, “State Borrowing No
Substitute for Additional Direct Aid to Help States Weather COVID
Downturn,” CBPP (June 29, 2020).

the recession ends would still be the same as it
had been expected to be before the crisis and this
borrowing.
But we do not mean to be overly prescriptive
about the need for pairing new revenue with
borrowing. First, the possible crisis that states are
heading into is so severe that it would be worth it
to cannibalize the future at least a little bit. Put
another way, the future crisis in revenue might be
even worse if states allow their economies to
contract too much now. Second, states like
California that had been running a surplus really
can roughly borrow from future surpluses. Third,
states like New Jersey have recently implemented
many smart corporate income tax reforms with
favorable results.20 It would be odd that only those
states that have still not made common-sense
reforms should borrow. Fourth, states can always
raise taxes later, and the politics of doing so might
be different during a recovery.
In the end, however, it would be better for
new borrowings to be paired with new revenue.
One compromise would put in place tax increases
that would only kick in as the economy expands
or if revenues come in too far below what is
needed.
What About Borrowing Limitation Rules?
Special debt rules have been part of American
public finance for almost two centuries, and for a
reason: It is tempting for current generations,
especially politicians, to saddle the future with
debt. States incurred huge debts in the 1830s
building infrastructure (such as canals), and
many of these projects ended up in the red when
the economy turned. This experience of states
facing default and near-default led to special
21
constitutional rules as to incurring debt.
However, to review that history and the
associated rationales for borrowing limits is to
understand why the current situation is different.
The current generation is not trying to saddle the
future with a speculative white elephant, but

17

See “Reforming State Corporate Income Taxes Can Yield Billions,”
supra note 2.
18

Nicole Nixon, “Newsom, California Lawmakers Agree to Budget
Deal That Avoids Cuts to Health and Social Services,” CapRadio, June
22, 2020.
19

See “How the Federal Reserve Should Help States and Localities
Right Now,” supra note 2.
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20

See “Reforming State Corporate Income Taxes Can Yield Billions,”
supra note 2.
21

See Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo and John Joseph Wallis, “Fiscal
Institutions and Fiscal Crises,” in Peter Conti-Brown and David A. Skeel,
When States Go Broke 23 (2012); Richard Briffault, “Foreword: The
Disfavored Constitution,” 34 Rutgers L.J. 907, 947-49 (2003).
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rather must ensure that the future generation is
given schooling and other services at least
roughly comparable to what was being provided
just a few months ago. States could hardly have
socked away $500 billion in case of pandemic.
And in fact, as we already noted, seared by the
Great Recession, many states entered into this
crisis with a reasonable level of budgetary
22
reserves.
So how can this sort of borrowing work? Can
a stream of future tax revenue actually be sold in
this way (that is, used to back borrowing in
advance of when those future tax revenues are
raised)? Yes, and indeed, there is a long history of
financing new development projects through, in
effect, selling the speculative increase in tax
revenue that the development is expected to
23
generate. This is called tax increment financing.
And there are even more interesting models.
For instance, states and localities sold their right
to revenue from the giant settlement with the
tobacco industry even though it was unclear how
24
much revenue that settlement would bring.
Those bonds contained features to manage the
uncertainty in the future revenues,25 and any
issued coronavirus deficit bonds could do
26
likewise.
But Doesn’t State Constitutional Law Forbid
General Deficit Spending?
Even if a good idea, we still must consider
obstacles to states borrowing in these ways
because of balanced budget rules in state
constitutions. Our first response is that, in some
states, either amending the constitution or
putting a constitutionally authorized borrowing
proposal on the ballot for voter approval is not

that difficult. Each state should consider holding
these votes or elections to authorize borrowing
under its rules. The rationale is compelling and
should carry the day in those votes or elections.
Of course, we appreciate that (for various
reasons) holding votes or elections might not be
appealing or possible in some states. But all is
not necessarily lost. State rules prohibiting
borrowing without an election have long been
found by the courts to have important
exceptions. We think our proposed borrowing
can fit under several of these exceptions,
although any state pursuing our approach
would have to carefully consider its own specific
case law. Here, we can only speak in broad
strokes.
As to available exceptions, we will review
two because we think the rationales for the legal
rules track our policy arguments reasonably
well. Some other exceptions might be available
as well and could be justified on similar policy
grounds.27
First, there is the cash flow borrowing
exception. Here is a classic example: Property
taxes are typically collected in one or two lump
sums by local governments. Should a county be
able to borrow at the nadir of its cash flow until
it gets its second installment of property tax
receipts? Courts in every state we know of say
that it can.28 As we explained, the borrowing we
are envisioning is also a cash flow borrowing,
albeit over a longer cycle. Thus, so long as the
overall structure is reasonable and does not put
future taxpayers at any greater risk, we think the
sort of borrowing we propose should also fit
within this cash flow borrowing exception.

27

22

Auxier, supra note 8.

23

Briffault, “The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the
Political Economy of Local Government,” 77(1) U. Chi. L. Rev. 65 (2010).
24

E. Matthew Quigley, “Securitizing Tobacco Settlements: The Basics,
the Benefits, the Risks,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (2002).
25

See id.; see also Steve Hong, Allen Davis, and Stephanie Larosiliere,
“Tobacco Bonds: An Unfiltered Look at a Unique Municipal Asset
Class,” Invesco (Jan. 8, 2018), for a somewhat recent discussion of the
market.
26

One important feature would be to permit a special redemption
option if the federal government does step up. Other important features
could include “turbo redemption” if revenues come in faster than
expected or lengthening the term of the borrowing if revenues come in
more slowly.

1140

If a state court has upheld the “subject to appropriation” exception,
then it would be straightforward for a legislature to use this exception,
because all it requires is that the debt not be secured by a promise to
repay. See Briffault, supra note 21.
There is also the different, more widespread contingent obligation
exception, which requires that the borrowing occur in the form of a
lease. Id. One issue with this exception is that it is unlikely to raise
enough revenue because the state would raise revenue by selling
property and then leasing it back. Note that Arizona used such a
structure during the Great Recession. See Peter Carbonara, “CashHungry States Are Putting Buildings on the Block,” The New York Times,
May 4, 2010.
28

See Robert S. Amdursky, Clayton P. Gillette, and G. Allen Bass,
Municipal Debt Financing Law section 4.4 (2013). During the Great
Depression, the California Supreme Court even upheld issuing claims on
future revenue that were not likely to be repaid until after the thencurrent two-year budget period. Riley v. Johnson, 6 Cal. 2d 529 (1936).
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29

Second, there is the special fund exception.
Under this exception, if all that investors are
promised is a specific revenue stream — and no
more — then those borrowings are not considered
to trigger the election requirement or other state
constitutional bars against deficit spending
because the government’s general taxing power is
not being promised. This exception is common,
but state courts also have varied on whether they
interpret it broadly or narrowly. The narrow
version of the exception potentially requires that
the borrowing be secured only by funds that
would not have existed if not for the borrowing —
say, by using only toll revenues to pay for a
30
bridge. The broader version of the exception
focuses on the separateness of the revenue stream
rather than the nexus with the project. Generally,
prominent commentators have considered the
narrow interpretation of the exception more
favorably than have the courts.31
Though we would not endorse the broader
view in every case, we think the narrow view is
unduly restrictive. To go back to the beginning,
the classic debt problems that ended in trouble in
the 1830s involved states backing up the debt of
private entities — such as a railroad — with the
taxing power of the state. If the project succeeded,
disproportionate benefits would flow to some
interest groups. Failure, however, would be borne
by all.
This blending of public and private was why
the debt limitation rules were typically
accompanied by constitutional provisions
regarding public purpose, gift of public funds,
32
subscription of stock, etc. This is also why
circumventing debt limitations through
privatization is problematic in ways that resonate

29

Amdursky, Gillette, and Bass, supra note 28, at section 4.5; Briffault,
supra note 21, at 917-19.

with the historical problem these provisions were
to solve.33
A revenue bond using securitized general tax
revenue — even new tax revenue, which is what
we propose as ideal — is also a burden on
taxpayers, but it is a cabined liability in time and
amount. Importantly, our proposals would not
involve taxpayers taking on unknown risks, much
less unknown risks based on speculative projects
particularly likely to benefit a powerful few.
Indeed, to the extent that the taxpayers get money
now, while bondholders have to wait to see how
much revenue that tax increases yield, taxpayers
have shifted risk from themselves to the investors,
effectively the opposite of the classic problematic
financings of the 19th century.34
It is true that the financings we propose could
balkanize the general tax base, and there are good
reasons to be concerned with this practice. But
this was not the primary target of the debt
limitation provisions, and we think courts should
be wary of constitutionalizing this concern. This is
because there is also an argument that earmarking
taxes does not destroy a tax base, but preserves it
because voters or interest groups will protect a tax
35
with clear benefits or beneficiaries. We are not
taking sides on the earmarking debate; our
primary concern is to argue that courts should
also not take sides absent a clear mandate. To fully
fit within our argument and the law in some
jurisdictions, it might be necessary for states to
securitize new revenue in this way.
Do State Constitutional Limits Even Apply
In an ‘Emergency’?
Beyond our earlier discussions, some state
debt limitation rules apply “except in case of
war to repel invasion or suppress
insurrection.”36 Those exceptions support the
legal case for borrowing under any exception.
At the broadest level, the emergency exception

30

See Amdursky, Gillette, and Bass, supra note 28, at section 4.6; see,
e.g.,City of Trinidad v. Haxby, 315 P.2d 204 (1957).
31

To be clear, prominent commentators seem more skeptical of a
broad reading, while courts seem split or even tend to the broader
analysis. See, e.g., Amdursky, Gillette, and Bass, supra note 28, at sections
4.5-6 (collecting cases, expressing doubt about broader interpretation of
exception); Briffault, supra note 21, at 919 (collecting cases and
concluding that: “The cases are not always consistent, but the trend has
been to loosen the nexus required between the project financed by the
bond and the revenues committed to paying off the obligation in order
to justify avoidance of the debt limitations”).
32

See Briffault supra note 21.
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33

Julie Roin, “Privatization and the Sale of Tax Revenues,” 85 Minn.
L. Rev. 1965 (2011).
34

Amdursky, Gillette, and Bass see the issue of who bears the risk as
central to the question whether a debt is constrained by the debt
limitation rules. Supra note 28, at section 4.1.
35

Susannah Camic Tahk, “Public Choice Theory & Earmarked
Taxes,” 68 Tax L. Rev. 755 (2015).
36

See, e.g., Cal. Const. Art. XVI, section 1. See also Amdursky, Gillette,
and Bass, supra note 28, at section 4.4.
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indicates an understanding that borrowing in
response to an emergency is not subject to the
same political process concerns as the
speculative financings of the 19th century. Thus,
a state court that has an exception of this kind in
its borrowing limitation has a textual warrant
for the proposition that debt limitation rules
were not meant to prevent borrowing in case of
emergency. This could be a useful complement
to using some other exception.
In at least one state, there is no need to use
the emergency language as a complement. In
New Jersey, this debt limitation provision grants
an exception for “acts of god,” and so borrowing
in response to the pandemic would seem to be
plainly permitted.37 Appropriately, the New
Jersey Legislature approved an almost $10
billion borrowing authorization. The statute was
challenged, but the New Jersey Supreme Court
38
unanimously upheld the law.
In states with the narrower insurrection/
invasion-type language, we think that the
legislature could still argue that no other
exception is needed by appealing to the canon of
ejusdem generis — these are the types of
emergencies that suspend the usual rule —
rather than that of expressio unius, which would
limit the emergencies to the ones named in the
constitution. And this makes sense: Why would
the authors of the state constitution except
emergency spending to treat the victims of a
war, but not a pandemic?
At least a few state courts have interpreted
their provisions broadly in roughly this manner.
For example, the Washington Supreme Court
upheld a bond issue for unemployment relief in
39
the midst of the Great Depression. The court
reasoned that mass unemployment had caused
signs of insurrection, and that the Legislature’s
determination that an “incipient” insurrection
existed was conclusive “unless, giving effect to
every presumption in its favor, the court can say
that such legislative declaration, on its face, is
obviously false and a palpable attempt at

40

dissimulation.” The California Supreme Court
found the issue whether an insurrection existed
to be a political question and permitted
borrowing in connection with bonuses to Civil
War soldiers41 and the financing of a railroad.42
Note that the California bonus provision was
made during the Civil War. Several state
supreme courts upheld borrowing for bonus
43
provisions for soldiers made after World War I.
If a state does plan to use any of these
exceptions, then it would be prudent to also create
a fast-tracked procedure so that the courts can
hear any possible legal objections quickly.
Conclusion
To go back to the beginning, we reemphasize
that what we are proposing here is inferior to the
federal government stepping in to do its job
44
adequately. However, especially if the only
other feasible choice is savage cuts to needed
spending programs, we consider borrowing of
the sort that we have proposed to be the far
superior option.


40
41
42
37

N.J. Const. Art. VIII, section 2.

38

Samantha Marcus, “Murphy Can Borrow Up to $9.9B During
Pandemic, N.J. Supreme Court Rules,” NJ.com, Aug. 12, 2020.
39

State ex rel. Hamilton v. Martin, 23 Pac.(2d) 1 (Wash. 1933).
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43

See id. at 4.
Franklin v. State Board of Examiners, 23 Cal. 273 (1863).
People v. Pacheco, 27 Cal. 175 (1865).
See, e.g., State v. Davis, 113 Kan. 4, 213 P. 171 (1923).

44

Note that this is the second crisis of the 21st century in which the
federal government has failed in this way; thus, the question whether
states should have more formal backup plans is one we plan to revisit.
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